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Using an overlapping generations model with liquidity risk, we show 
that equilibrium aggregate investment and asset prices are cyclical. 
In an economy with neither a beginning nor an ending date, a 
stationary equilibrium can be obtained. In a startable equilibrium 
however, economic activity is highly cyclical. The first generation 
and consecutive odd ones invest most of their wealth in new long 
lived technologies, while even generations flock to seasoned claims 
that are sold by liquidity challenged older cohorts. We find that this 
liquidity driven cyclicality is driven by the optimal length of the 
investment horizon, not by agent live spans. 
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* Saïd Business School, University of Oxford and Linacre College. I thank participants of the finance 
workshop at the University of Oxford for valuable feedback. All errors are mine.  1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of business cycles is widely documented and studied. Despite a rich 
literature on the subject, there still exists significant controversy on the subject […]. 
In this paper we suggest a novel explanation for the existence of business cycles. We 
show that in world of identical overlapping generations that are subject to liquidity 
risk, a pattern of cyclical consumption constitutes a stable equilibrium. 
Rational agents invest in a mix of new, long term production technologies and 
seasoned short term existing claims thereon. Agents who become ‘impatient’ sell their 
claims to younger generations. We find that even though returns on production 
technologies are stationary and certain, prices and returns in the secondary market for 
financial claims are not. Consider the case where a generation invest large amounts in 
long term technologies. When more members of this generation become impatient, 
supply in the secondary market increases, depressing security prices. This entices a 
second generation to buy more existing claims, and invest less in new technologies. 
As these short term claims expire, their prices increase because old agents demand 
them, but middle aged can no longer supply them. This leads newborns to shy away 
from the secondary market and instead invest more in new technologies. Then the 
cycle repeats itself. 
This story is congruent with several observations regarding business cycles. [….]. 
When stock prices are low, investment in new technologies is depressed, leading to 
lower future consumption and production. 
2. The model 
We consider a two-periodic, three-date overlapping generations model à la Samuelson 
(1958). On each date of an infinite horizon economy a new generation of price taking 
agents is born, each with an endowment of one unit of consumption good, denoted 
dollars. Agents live either one period, with probability λ, or two periods, and consume 
before they die. They derive increasing utility, U, from consumption on the last date 
of their life.
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1 In Samuelson’s model, two dates were for production, one for consumption. Because we aim to study 
the affect of agents’ liquidity needs, we split their post-productive life up in two periods. This 
simplified assumption and the assumption that patient agents do not consume at date 1, are innocuous 
and do not change the main findings of our model. Agents can invest their dollars in either one- or two-period bonds. Two-period bonds 
with facevalue $R are issued in the primary market by the competitive productive 
sector of the economy, at a price of $1. One-period bonds are traded in the secondary 
market between patient and impatient agents. This model was earlier studied by Qi 
(1994), Bhattacharya and Padilla (1996), Fulghieri and Rovelli (1998), and 
Bhattacharya, Fulghieri and Rovelli (1998).
2 
In the next section we derive the set of stationary equilibriums which meet the Nash-
condition in an economy where time is infinite both backward and forward. In section 
4 we derive the equilibrium for the economy that has a beginning date, but no end. 
We will see that the allocation in such an economy is uniquely determined. We refer 
to this latter equilibrium it as the startable equilibrium. 
3. Stationary Equilibriums 
If, in a game with certain payoffs but uncertain preferences, time is represented by t ∈ 
 , we can find the equilibrium from the maximization problem of an agent who is 
born on date t. Because agents are atomistic, their objective function is: 
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Where yt is the investment, at t, in two-period bonds and pt the market price of one-
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Because borrowing and lending are not ruled out, this first order condition must hold 
to avoid infinite demand for borrowing or lending. Therefore we must have: 
Proposition 1 (stationary equilibrium) 
In the stationary economy there exist infinitely many two-periodic equilibriums. For 
any pair of consecutive prices we have 1   ii pp R + = ,   ps, pt  ∈ [1,R]. 
Proof: follows immediately from the first order condition. 
                                                 
2 The mentioned papers used the model, an overlapping generations variant of the Diamond Dybvig  
(1983)model where risksharing agents face the possibility of having future unverifiable liquidity needs, 
to investigate the bank versus exchange question. Remark 1: Every equilibrium price-process {pi,pi+1}, can be supported by one pure 
investment strategy, and many mixing strategies. In both cases agents born on date i 
invest an expected amount of yi = (1-λ)(R-pi)/(R-1) in the long term production 
technology, and use the remainder of their endowment to purchase existing claims. 
Remark 2: An agent born on date i expects to consume is λpi+1+(1-λ)R. In general 
then agents of consecutive generations consume different amounts. If agents are risk 
averse, the equilibrium which maximizes intergenerational welfare would then have 
pi =  R  for all i. We assume that it is the social attractiveness of this one-periodic 
equilibrium’s that lead Qi (1994), Bhattacharya and Padilla (1996) and Fulghieri and 
Rovelli (1998) to disregard the cyclical equilibria.
3 From a pure game theoretic point 
of view however, there is no reason to believe that the welfare maximizing 
equilibrium is obtained. In fact, in the following we find that if the economy has a 
starting date, the unique equilibrium is the Pareto inferior two-periodic business cycle. 
4. Startable Equilibrium 
If, in a game with certain payoffs but uncertain preferences, time is represented by t ∈ 
 
+, the first generation decides which of the stationary equilibria is played. Since 
there is no secondary market at date zero, and the only alternative to investing is 
storing, the first generation solves: 
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is positive for all p1 > 1, the first generation invests it entire endowment in the two-
period bonds. We then have:  
Proposition 1 (startable equilibrium) 
In the  
+ economy we have podd = 1,  peven = R,  y0 = yeven = 1, yodd = 1-λ. 
Proof: follows immediately from the f.o.c.  
                                                 
3 Bhattacharya, Fulghieri and Rovelli (1998) mention that there exist only two equilibriums, pi = 
R ∀i and  p = ..,1,R,1,R,…., and focus on the former. The cyclical equilibrium is extraordinarily robust. Although the agents’ aversion to 
risk makes the one-periodic stationary equilibriums the most desirable one, risk 
preferences do not determine the equilibrium. This is simply because there is no 
uncertainty. In the following we discuss several extensions of our model. 
5. Extensions  
To demonstrate the main trust of our story, we have resorted to the simplest possible 
model. In the following we relax some of these abstracting assumptions. 
5.1. Short term production technologies  
The base case assumes that the only alternative to the long-lived production 
technology is costless storage. In the following we show that also if storage is costly 
or if there exists a productive short term investment, cyclicality is retained, unless the 
per period return on the short term technology is higher than that on the long term 
technology. In particular: 
Proposition 3: If, apart from the long term technology, agents have access to a one-
period technology that offers a return  0 < r <  R , the startable equilibrium will 
have:  
  podd = max(1,r),  peven = min(R,R
r ),  




















   
proof: We only need consider the first generation’s problem:   
  () 00 1 0 0
0
1
max (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
rR
Uy r y p Uy y R y p
⎛⎞
λ−+ + − λ − + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 
Which has as f.o.c. r = p 1. The accompanying y0 follow from the market clearing 
conditions.   
Not surprisingly, the existence of a productive alternative to the storage technology 
reduces the cyclicality. If r  ≥ R , no cyclicality will survive as the long term 
technology is superfluous. If on the other hand storage is costly, r < 1, the equilibrium 
will not be affected, as in the base case there is no storage. To the referee: I am currently in the process of “beefing up” the paper with a more 
complete literature review and additional extensions as mentioned below. I am 
confident that by the summer the paper will be finished and polished, and will 
certainly make for an interesting presentation. 
ii) population growth, call it g. As long as g <  R , cyclicality obtains in the startable 
economy. In can easily be shown that in this case prices are podd = g, peven = R/g. Only in the 
(less intuitive) case of g > R  are prices stationary: pi =  R  ∀ i. The intuition behind this 
one-periodic equilibrium (proof omitted) is that the second generation will not drive the price 
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iii) investor’s life span. Assume has an infinite life, but dies with probability λ(a) where a 
stands for age (the continuous variation of this, was introduced by Blanchard (1985)). we 
could use any function, including the mortality rate predicted by “Gomperty’s Law” (see 
Wetterstrand 1981)). The objective function of an agent born on date i then becomes: 
11 1
1
(1 (1)) max  (1) (1 (1)) (1) (2) (1) (2) (2) ... ()
t




Uy y p U y p y y p ya pp p
++ +
+
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −
λ− + + λ + − + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠














λ⋅− + λ − + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠
∑ i  
So that ptpt+1 = R Î we still have two-periodicity. 
iv) number of dates before LT asset pays of. Assume asset pays R in three periods. Rest is the 
same. Then agents can choose between one-year bonds, two-year bonds and three-year bonds. 
Then it turns out that we have three-periodicity.  
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i  hence  11 tt t p qq ++ =  and  1 tt t p qq− =   
Hence we have a three-periodic equilibrium where 11 1 2   tt t t tt R qq q q qq − ++ + = = . 
Hence the two-periodicity depends on the length of the payoff, not on the maximum 
age of the agents!!! References 
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